NAIROBI, Kenya — The High Court has declared two key provisions of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes (Amendment) Act, 2025 unconstitutional, delivering a landmark victory for media freedom, freedom of expression and digital rights in Kenya.
In a judgment delivered on Thursday, Justice Patricia Nyaundi ruled that Parliament exceeded constitutional limits by granting excessive powers to a government committee to block websites and criminalising certain forms of speech using vague and subjective language.
The case arose from consolidated petitions filed by the Law Society of Kenya alongside media rights organisations, civil society groups, politicians and other petitioners, who argued that the amendments posed a serious threat to constitutional freedoms.
At the centre of the dispute was an amendment empowering the National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee to order websites and digital applications rendered inaccessible if they were considered to promote “unlawful activities,” “religious extremism,” “cultism” or other prohibited content.
Justice Nyaundi found that the provision effectively handed an administrative body the power to censor online content without judicial oversight.
“The amendment confers upon an administrative body a sweeping authority to impose prior restraint, the most severe form of censorship,” the judge ruled.
The court further warned that the law would create a chilling effect on freedom of expression by encouraging journalists, digital platforms, content creators and ordinary citizens to censor themselves for fear of punishment.
Consequently, the court declared Section 6(1)(ja) unconstitutional, finding that it violated Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Constitution, which safeguard freedom of conscience, freedom of expression and media freedom. The judge also held that the State had failed to demonstrate that the restrictions met the constitutional threshold for limiting fundamental rights under Article 24.
In another major finding, the court struck down amendments to Section 27(1)(b), which criminalised communication deemed “likely to cause” another person to commit suicide.
Justice Nyaundi ruled that the provision lacked legal certainty because it relied on speculative and subjective interpretations.
“The provision introduces a speculative, indeterminate and wholly subjective basis for criminal liability,” the judgment stated.
The petitioners had argued that the amendment could expose journalists, bloggers, activists and members of the public to arbitrary arrests and prosecutions while discouraging legitimate public discourse through fear of criminal sanctions.
The court agreed that vague criminal provisions risk suppressing protected speech, warning that criticism of public institutions or government actions could be interpreted differently depending on subjective perceptions.
Although the High Court dismissed claims that Parliament failed to conduct adequate public participation or that the Senate had been improperly excluded from the legislative process, it held that the contested provisions themselves were inconsistent with the Constitution.
The ruling has been widely viewed as one of the strongest judicial affirmations of media freedom and digital rights in recent years, reinforcing the principle that executive agencies cannot impose censorship without court supervision.
The judgment also underscores that while the State has a legitimate responsibility to combat cybercrime—including offences such as hacking, online fraud and digital exploitation—such efforts must remain consistent with constitutional protections for free expression, independent journalism and access to information.
By invalidating Sections 6(1)(ja) and 27(1)(b) while leaving the remainder of the law intact, the High Court reaffirmed that legislation intended to address cybercrime cannot be used to undermine the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
The consolidated petitions therefore partially succeeded, with the court ordering each party to bear its own costs.
